What Does It Mean to Know Something?
Why is knowledge better than true belief—and does it actually matter?
In one of Plato's most well-known dialogues, the Meno, Plato wrestles with a deceptively simple question: why do we prefer a guide who knows the way to a destination over one who simply believes they know the way? After all, both guides would get you there just the same. Plato uses this thought experiment to expose a deeper problem about the value of knowledge over mere belief, and the philosopher Bernard Williams later returned to the same question with a more detailed answer. In the Meno, Plato asks the question, "Why is knowledge better than true belief?”
In the Meno, Plato asks the question: Why is knowledge better than true belief? He uses the example of a guide to the city of Larisa. Through the character of Meno, Plato wonders why we would prefer a guide who knows the way to Larisa rather than one who simply has true belief. After all, in both cases, the end result would be the same, as both guides would successfully lead their travelers to Larisa. It seems that for the practical purpose of getting someone to Larisa, there is no difference between knowledge and true belief. Plato uses this thought experiment to expose a problem: if true belief is just as effective as knowledge for successful action, then what is the value of knowledge?
At the time, Plato used Logos to make the distinction between knowledge and true belief. Knowledge was defined as true belief, plus the added factor of Logos, which could be interpreted as an account of the cause of the belief. Essentially, Plato saw knowledge as true belief paired with some sort of justifiable reasoning for said belief. He uses the analogy of the statues of Daedalus, which were so lifelike they would run away if not chained down. Like the statues, true beliefs are valuable, but they serve no purpose unless they can be “tethered down” or secured in the mind. For Plato, the act of “tethering down” these beliefs is like giving an account for the reason or cause of why they are true. Having that account transforms true beliefs into reliable knowledge. Essentially, he argues that the value in knowledge is in its security and reliability. While knowledge and true belief may lead to the same results in a specific instance, over the long run, having reliable true beliefs will produce more successful action.
Williams would answer Meno's question in a similar but more detailed fashion. He would agree with Plato that in the specific instance of Larisa, TB and knowledge are both equally effective at producing successful action. However, he argues that knowledge is still more valuable than true belief because the desire for truth rationally commits us to desiring truth via reliable methods, which are more likely to produce truth. He uses an analogy where he equates action as the way to fulfill desire to knowledge as the way to fulfill true belief. Say A desires to be happy. Williams argues that A does not just want to be happy but wants the happiness to arise from actions that are likely to make one happy. A does not want to be happy by chance or by accident, but through actions that generally and reliably lead to happiness. This way, their desire is more likely to be fulfilled, as the reliable methods for happiness are intrinsic in A’s desire. Similarly, if one desires true belief, they would want that belief to arise in a way that makes it likely to be true or unlikely to be false. Williams is not redefining knowledge as TB + some sort of reliable method but rather explaining why reliable belief-forming methods have value. The value of knowledge over true belief, according to Williams, is that it produces belief in a way that minimizes the chances of that belief being false.
If we return to the Meno, Williams would prefer a guide with knowledge because they are less vulnerable. The preference is based not on the action of getting to Larisa, but on the security of the guide's belief. For example, if doubt arises on the trip, say a passerby tells them Larisa is going the opposite direction, what reasoning does the guide have to fall back on in order to find the way? The value in having a guide with knowledge lies in the security of the belief, which in turn leads to a more reliable way to produce successful action.
Can any definition of knowledge survive a well-constructed counterexample?
In 1963, a philosopher named Edmund Gettier wrote a surprisingly short paper that managed to dismantle a definition of knowledge philosophers had relied on for centuries, namely the idea that knowledge is simply a true and justified belief. Linda Zagzebski built on his work and argued that no matter how carefully you construct a definition of knowledge, as long as it follows the same basic formula, she can construct a scenario that defeats it. Alvin Goldman attempted to build something more airtight by grounding knowledge in cause and effect, arguing that to truly know something, the fact itself must have directly caused your belief in it. The response below explores whether Goldman's definition can hold up against Zagzebski's challenge.
Zagzebski's argument is that any account of knowledge that features true belief + X (where X is some sort of justification clause for the belief) can be put into a specific scenario where it does not result in knowledge. She calls this process “gettierization” after Edmund Gettier's famous paper, which provided examples of justified true belief not resulting in knowledge. She argues that in any case where knowledge is defined as true belief + X, a scenario can be constructed where knowledge is not produced. Her formula goes as follows:
Construct a case where the subject has a belief that satisfies whatever justification (X) clause is present.
Make the belief false.
Modify the case so the belief happens to be true as a result of luck or an accident that is unrelated to the initial X clause.
Since the belief is only connected to X by luck, TB + X doesn't result in knowledge, meaning X isn't enough to guarantee knowledge.
Take the example of TB + justification. A person looking at a field sees a sheep and concludes that “there is a sheep in the field.” The justification is that under normal lighting conditions, the perception of a sheep is a reliable indicator that there is a sheep. Now modify the scenario so that the person is actually looking at a detailed model of a sheep. They are justified in the statement “there is a sheep in the field,” yet it is a false statement. Then make it so there is actually a sheep in the field, hidden from the person. Now the statement “there is a sheep in the field” is true, but only by chance, and does not produce knowledge. Zagzebski argues that this process is applicable to any TB + X account of knowledge.
Goldman provides an account of knowledge where true belief is justified through an appropriate causal connection. Essentially, S's belief in P must be causally connected to the fact that P is in an appropriate way. A casual connection means that the fact or truth maker must stand at the beginning of a causal chain that leads directly to the person forming the belief. For example, if I see a sheep in the field, the fact that the sheep is there causes light to reflect off it into my eyes, which I then translate into the belief that a sheep is in the field. Goldman adds the “appropriate” clause to rule out what he calls deviant causal chains, cases where the fact that p causes the belief that p, but in the wrong kind of way. For instance, imagine that a sheep is in a field, but the subject’s belief “there is a sheep in the field” is caused not by seeing the sheep itself but by its shadow. The presence of the sheep does cause the shadow, and the shadow causes the belief, but the causal chain is accidental and misleading. Goldman argues this is not knowledge, which is why the "appropriate clause” is necessary.
Goldman's account of knowledge does not escape Zagzebski's “General Rule” because while it creates a very specific set of conditions that produce knowledge, it is not fundamentally different from any other X or justification clause. As Zagzeski predicts, there are examples that can be constructed where an appropriate causal connection does not lead to knowledge. Say I’m shopping at a clothing store that advertises that they sell authentic Supreme hoodies. However, the store is a scam that actually sells knock-offs. Although there are slight differences between knock-offs and the real hoodies, I am not knowledgeable enough to tell the difference. However, I do know that authentic hoodies have a certain type of stitching. I find a rack of identical knockoff hoodies and pick one randomly from the rack. Unknown to me, the hoodie I picked was an authentic one that had been left there by mistake. My friend asks me what I have. I say, “This is an authentic Supreme hoodie.” I believe it's authentic because the stitching, weight, and logo placement on this specific hoodie caused me to judge it as real. The visual and sensory inputs of the real hoodie cause me to believe it's real, but I only possess that hoodie by chance. Had I taken another hoodie, I would not have been able to tell the difference and would have falsely believed it was real.
This example satisfies Goldman's causal connection because the hoodie is causing my belief in its authenticity. It follows an appropriate causal path because it's the same causal connection I would have used regardless of where I bought the hoodie. Had I bought it at an actual Supreme store and the hoodie was real, I would have used the same visual and sensory cues to justify its authenticity. Yet I do not have knowledge of the hoodie's authenticity, because my true belief only came about as a matter of chance when I picked the only real hoodie. Therefore, Goldman's causal connection is subject to Zagzebski's rule. The causal condition, like any X condition, cannot prevent luck from making a true belief non-knowledge. Just because the clause is more specific does not mean it guarantees truth. Similarly, his appropriate clause does not guarantee truth. An appropriate causal chain can be used in scenarios, like in the identification of the hoodie, where the truth can be detached from the justification by luck. While Goldman does provide an X condition that wouldn't necessarily be considered a justification, it's still defeated by Zagzebski's rule.
